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Comments
MEDICAL MAPRACICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ADOPTION OF THE
DiscovERY RuLE-Plaintiff underwent a sterilization operation and ap-
proximately eleven months later delivered a child. One month and
three days after the birth of the child, suit was brought against the
physician' alleging that as a result of the pregnancy plaintiff suffered
mental and physical pain and anguish, and her husband incurred and
will incur medical expenses, loss of consortium, and expenses incident
to nurturing the child until majority. The trial court dismissed the
complaint, finding that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations.2 Plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed. A cause of action
for medical malpractice does not accrue under the statute of limita-
tions3 until the discovery of the injury. Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459
S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970).
It has always been the rule in Kentucky4 that a cause of action for
medical malpractice accrues on the date of the operation.5 The basis
1 The complaint shows on its face that the operation was performed September
24, 1966; that the appellant Lilly Tomlinson became pregnant November 23, 1967;
that on December 23, 1967, the appellee examined Mrs. Tomlinson; that on
January 19, 1968, Mrs. Tomlinson was again examined by the appellee; that on
February 25, 1968, it was determined Mrs. Tomlinson was pregnant; that on
August 16, 1968, a child was born from the pregnancy; and that on November 1,
1968, this action was commenced. 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970).
2Ky. REV. STAT. [hereinafter cited as K.R.S.] § 413.140 (1) (e) (1916):
Actions to be brought within one year.
The following actions shall be brought within one year after the
cause of action accrued:
(e) An action against a physician or surgeon for negligence or
malp ractice.
Jones v. Furnell, 406 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966) (patient's action against surgeon
brought more than one year after operation is barred by statute of limitations);
Turner v. Rust, 385 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1964) (action against a physician or
surgeon for malpractice shall be commenced within one year after the cause of
action accrues); Philpot v. Stacy, 371 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. 1963) (plaintiffs action
against physician not commenced within one year after last treatment is barred by
the statute of limitations); Carter v. Harlan Hospital Ass'n, 97 S.W.2d 9 (Ky.
1936) (action for malpractice shall be commenced within one year after the cause
of action accrues, and not thereafter); Roush v. Wolfe, 47 S.W.2d 1021 (Ky.
1932) (malpractice action barred by one-year statute of limitations)- Guess v.
Linton, 32 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1930) (action againstphysician for mafpractice is
barred unless brought within one year from accrual ofaction).
5 The Supreme Court declared in Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58 62
(1926) that the word "accrued' as used in the statute, does not have any defnite
technical meaning and must be interpreted in the light of the statute's general
purposes and oth~er provisions, and with regard for the practical ends to be served
by any statute of limitations.
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for this view began with an amendment to the statute of limitations in
1916 which provided that:
An action for an injury to the person or the plaintiff, or of his
wife, child, ward, apprentice, or servant,... an action against any
physician or surgeon for negligence or malpractice .. .shall be
commenced within one year next after the cause of action accrued,
and not thereafter.6
According to the opinion in Roush v. Wolfe7 this amendment was
added by the Kentucky General Asseibly to cope with decisions of
the Court of Appeals8 which held that an action against a physician
for malpractice was one ex contractu and thus governed by the five-
year statute of limitations9 rather than the one-year statute of limita-
tions'O applicable to actions for injury and damage to the person."
Several years after Roush the Court in Carter v. Harlan Hospital
Association'2 clarified what was meant by "an action accrues." In
that case the Court held a cause of action accrues when a party
ascertains that he has a cause of action.'3 Almost three decades later
in Philpot v. Stacy14 the Court again attempted to clarify the statute.
The following was their explanation of when the statute starts to run.
[W]ith respect to the Statute of Limitations, the time of injury
itself is the controlling fact, and not the means by which the injury
is inficted.15
Thus through the years the Court has consistently adhered to
this strict interpretation of the statute that an action accrues at the
time of the injury, and not until the instant case has it thoroughly
re-evaluated this construction of the statute.
A survey of other jurisdictions in the United States illustrates
that all have some type of statute which limits the time in which a
6 Ky. AcTs ch. 92, § 2516 (1916).
747 S.W.2d 1021 (Ky. 1932).
8See Wood v. Downing's Adm'r, 62 S.W. 487 (Ky. 1901); Menefee v.
Alexander, 53 S.W. 653 (Ky. 1899).
9K.R.S. § 413.120 (1) (1932).
0K.R.S. § 413. 140 (1) (e) (1916).
11 For two cases which held that a suit against a physician was barred by
the malpractice statute of limitations applicable to actions ex contractu, see
Barnoff v. Aldridge, 38 S.W.2d 1029 1030 (Mo. 1931); Horowitz v. Bogart, 218
App. Div. 158, 217 N.Y.S. 881, 882 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
1297 S.W.2d 9, 10 (Ky. 1936).
'3 See, e.g., Philpot v. Stacy, 371 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Ky. 1963); Smith v. McComb
Infirmary Ass'n, 196 So. 2d 91, 92-93 (Miss. 1967); Hawks v. DeHart, 146 S.E.2d
187, 189 (Va. 1966). See also PnossER, LAw OF ToaTs § 30 (3d ed. 1964).
14371 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. 1963). See also The Third Annual Kentucky Court of
Appeals Review, 54 Ky. L.J. 285, 381 (1965).
'5 philpot v. Stacy, 371 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Ky. 1963).
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tort action must be commenced.' 6 These statutes are generally in
terms which require commencement of the limitations period "when
the cause of action accrues."17 Traditionally, this phrase has been
construed to mean that the statutory period in a malpractice action
commences on the date of the alleged act or omission. I s The reason-
ing behind this is that it is the act, rather than the ensuing damage,
which constitutes the basis of the cause of action.19 If there is notice-
able injury or damage when the original act of negligence occurred
this rule usually leads to equitable results.20 However, strict applica-
tion of this doctrine presents real difficulties when the statutory period
expires before the plaintiff discovers he has been injured at all.21
Harsh consequences resulting from a strict interpretation of the
statute have led many jurisdictions to judicially develop exceptions
to the rule. The injured plaintiff has been allowed to recover on
the theory of implied contract.22 An application of this theory provides
the injured party with a longer limitations period, which most jurisdic-
tions make applicable to contract actions. Secondly, where a physician
or surgeon continues to treat a patient for a certain ailment, and the
plaintiff's action for medical malpractice relates to treatment received
16 See C. STmman & A. Mon=z, DocroR AND PATIENT AND = LAW 807,
890-91 (4th ed. 1962); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 68
HAnv. L. REv. 1177 (1950). Approximately one-half of the states have statutes
which are specifically applicable to malpractice actions, and which provide that
the action must be commenced within a certain number of years after the cause
of action accrues. The remaining make provision for the number of years in which
the action must be commenced and give no indication of the time when the
statutory period will begin to run.17 This is the terminology in Kentucky and several other states. See, e.g.,
Comment, 55 IOwA L. REv. 486 n.2 (1969).
18 For several cases following the "act of omission" rule, see Roybal v. White,
888 P.2d 250 (N.M. 1963); Jewell v. Price, 142 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1965); Hawks
v. DeHart, 146 S.E.2d 187 (Va. 1966); Reistad v. Manz, 105 N.W.2d 324
(Wis. 1960).
19 This rule is well stated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:
Any act of misconduct or negligence . . . in the service undertaken ...
gave rise to a right of action in contract or tort, and the statutory period
began to run at that time, and not when the actual damage results or is
ascertained.. . . The damage sustained by the wrong done is not the
cause of action...
Cappuci v. Barone, 165 N.E. 658, 654-55 (Mass. 1919).0 See Krantz & Schwartz, Statutes of Limitations in Cases of Insidious Dis-
eases, 12 CLv.-MAn. L. REv. 225, 227 (1968).
21 See Anderson, The Application of Statutes of Limitation to Actions Against
Physicians and Surgeons, 25 INs. CoUNsEL J. 237 (1958); Lillich, The Malpractice
Statute of Limitations in New York and Other jurisdictions, 47 CoRuNrLL L. REv.
389 (1962); Note, Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations, 82 IND. LJ. 528
(1957).2 2 See generally, Lillich, supra note 21; Miller, The Contractual Liability of
Psysicians and Surgeons, 1953 WAsH. U.L.O. 413, 424 (1953); Note, Theory of a
Medical Malpractice Action-Time Limitations and Damages, 64 W. VA. L. REv.
412, 417 (1962). For a Kentucky case where the court would not accept the
contract theory see Roush v. Wolfe, 47 S.W.2d 1021 (Ky. 1932).
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from the physician for that ailment, he may be allowed to recover
under a "continuous treatment" exception.23 The reasoning behind this
exception is that the patient is usually not put on notice of the error
of the physician, upon whom he continues to rely for treatment, and
thus the limitations statute does not commence running until the
treatment is completed. 24 Finally, courts may adopt a "fraudulent
concealment" exception 5 where the physician or surgeon has knowl-
edge of an error committed while treating a patient and attempts to
conceal the error.26 Under this exception the statute does not begin
to run until the patient discovers, or with due diligence should have
discovered, his injury.
27
Judicial application of the above exceptions has not completely
alleviated the harshness of the traditional approach, leading the courts
to re-evaluate the point in time when a cause of action "accrues" in
a medical malpractice case. This point in time has been generally
labeled the "discovery rule" and affords us with a measuring device
as to the majority and minority viewpoints in the United States. In
general there are two rules in the United States governing the running
of statutes of limitation in medical malpractice suits. In the majority
of states the statute begins to run at the date of the operation;28 while
in the minority, the statute commences to run only after the discovery
of the alleged malpractice.2 9
The principle relied upon most by those jurisdictions rejecting
the discovery rule is that statutes of limitation were established to
protect parties from long waiting periods after which they would
have the problem of defending stale claims.30 This reasoning reveals
a conflict between two basic policies of law: (1) to allow meritorious
claimants an opportunity to be heard; (2) to discourage stale and
possibly fraudulent claims. Those adopting the majority view resolve
23 See Sacks, Statutes of Limitations in Undiscovered Malpractice, 16 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REv. 65, 67-68 (1967).2 4 E.g., Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp. Inc., 92 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Minn.
1958); Williams v. Elias, 1 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Neb. 1941).2 5 For a more detailed explanation of this exception, see Lillich, supra note 21,
at 63-64; 82 IND. L.J., supra note 22, at 535-40.
20For a Kentucky case in point see Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791, 794
(Ky. 1952).
27The determination of when the party discovers or should have discovered
the injury is usually a jury question. See, e.g., Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577,
580 (Tex. 1967). For a general discussion of Gaddis v. Smith, see Comment, 28
MD. L. REv. 47 (1968).28 See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961).
20 Id. For an excellent discussion of the discovery rule and those jurisdictions
adopting it see Note, Medical Malpractice: A Survey of Statutes of Limitations,
3 SuFrorx U.L. Rxv. 597, 615 (1969).30 See 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Action § 1 (1948); Baxter, Statutes of Limita-
tions in Legal Malpractice., 18 CLzv.-MAR. L, REv, 82 (1969).
KENTucK LAw JoUNAL[
the conflict by stating that the statute of limitations is inflexible and
functions without regard to the merits of a case. Also these courts
feel that adoption of the discovery rule is within the functions of
the legislature.31 These courts also conclude that with the passage
of time it becomes harder for the defendant to prove that he was not
negligent and if further time passes it may be impossible to determine
if the plaintiff's injury was a result of the defendant's negligence
at all.
32
Application of the discovery rule has been most often made to
medical malpractice cases dealing with foreign objects left in a
patient's body during surgery.33 Courts have been more reluctant,
however, to apply it to other malpractice cases, usually involving a
misdiagnosis followed by treatment which proves injurious to the
patient. Those courts favoring the discovery rule tend to base their
the statutes. Since the statutes of limitation make no mention of
reasoning on the premise that it is more equitable and fair to the
patient. They feel that the injured party should be allowed to be
heard when his injury was of an "inherently unknowable"34 origin 35
The patient is without notice of his injuries and thus unaware of any
right he may have until the injury is discovered.
Another factor in judicial adoption of the discovery rule has been
the attempt by courts to determine legislative intent when interpreting
(Ky. 1963) (the ruling in the instant case overrules this decision); Linquist v.
foreign object cases and the courts have applied the discovery rule
to them, it would seem just as logical for the courts to require ap-
plication of the discovery rule in misdiagnosis cases.
A third reason for application of the discovery rule in medical
malpractice cases is that the strict adherence to the wording in the
statute may penalize the conscientious physician while protecting
the unscrupulous one. The reasoning here is that a physician could
be aware of the presence of a foreign object in the patient's body
31 Hill v. Hays, 395 P.2d 298 (Kan. 1964); Philpot v. Stacy, 371 S.W.2d 11
Mullen, 277 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1954). The courts find support for this position as a
result of statutory amendments by various state legislatures to include the dis-
covery rule in some situations, but have not specifically mentioned medical
malpractice.
32 Owens v. White, 380 F.2d 310, 316 (9th Cir. 1967); 32 ND. LJ., supra
note 21.33,Tessier v. United States, 269 F.2d 305, 308 (1st Cir. 1959) (needles left in
patient's body); Morrison v. Acton, 198 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1948) (metal
fragment from surgical instrment left in body of patient); Murray v. Allen, 154
A. 678, 680 (Vt. 1931) (gauze pads left in patient's body).
34 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949).
35 See, e.g., Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 389 P.2d 224, 231-32 (Idaho 1964);
Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788, 792-93 (Pa. 1959); Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631,
634 (Wash. 1969).
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and not reveal this to the patient. If the patient is unable to prove
this concealment by the physician, under the traditional approach
his action might be barred before he discovers the injury.
The Kentucky Court, in the instant case, begins the discussion of
its reasoning in adopting the "discovery" rule by conceding that
"[i]t has always been the rule in this state that causes of action
such as the present one 'accrue' on the date of the operation."36
Mention is then made that the appellants also concede this to be
the law but insist that this law be overruled and the discovery
rule be adopted. The Court was in agreement with this premise
and in adopting it relied heavily on Delaware,37 Pennsylvania, 38
California3 9 and federal court cases40 which have followed the dis-
covery rule.41 The Court also listed states which take the view that
time of discovery is immaterial.42 From the case authority the Court
found a definite trend in many jurisdictions to adopt the discovery
rule. In deciding to adopt the discovery rule in Kentucky, the Court
concluded:
It may be thought that changing the rule in this jurisdiction
so that the cause of action does not accrue under the statute until
the discovery of the injury may result in great hardship to phy-
sicians and surgeons because of the possibility that the cause of
action may accrue long after the operation, but when measured
against total loss of plaintiff's cause of action barred under the
formal rule, we think the change is less likely to produce injustice.
In any event, this possible hardship on the physician or surgeon
may wash out on the trial of the merits of the controversy.43
It thus seems evident that the Court's reasoning, analysis and
application of the law in this case was both equitable and justifiable.
The "discovery" approach seems to be the most equitable, for not
until a plaintiff has discovered his injury does he have an opportunity
to claim his cause of action. To deny recovery to the plaintiff when
he could not possibly discover the negligent act until after the statute
had run would be a far greater injustice than the resulting dis-
advantage to the defendant.
36 459 S.W.2d at 167.
37 Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968).
38 Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959).
39 Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 327 P.2d 181 (1958).4 0 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
41 For other states that have adopted the discovery rule see Davis v. Bone-
brake, 313 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1957); Thomas v. Lobrano 76 So. 2d 599 (La. 1954);
Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943); Nowell v. Hamilton, 107 S.E.2d
112 (N.C. 1959); McFarland v. Connally, 252 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1952).4 2 See Annot. 80 A.L.R.2d 320 (1961).
48 459 S.W.2d at 168.
1971]
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The Court saw a situation in which the strict interpretation of the
statute of limitations was causing harsh consequences, decided not
to wait for legislative action to change the wording of the statute,
and acted on its own authority to give the patient an effective means
of obtaining relief. Hopefully this will bring about the enactment
of legislation which will change the wording of the present statute
and incorporate the discovery rule into its actual language.
Michael W. Hawkins
CONSTITmtIONAL LAw-DFENDANT'S BiGHT TO A JuRY TRIAI-Is Six
ENouGH?-In Williams v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court
held that a twelve-man jury is not a necessary part of "trial by jury"
and that a six-man panel does not violate a defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights as applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 The reasons put forth by the Court for overturning a constitu-
tional mandate which has existed since at least 18982 are not only
inadequate, but are not in fact the basis for the decision. An examina-
tion of the Court's rationale reveals that no basis for change was
found; only an absence of evidence strong enough to prevent the
removal of the constitutional requirement. The choice the Court
posed for itself was not between a twelve-man jury and a smaller
panel, but rather was a choice between continued recognition of a
constitutional right and harmonious development of a judicially
190 S. Ct. 1893 (1970). Williams, charged with robbery, filed a pretrial
motion in a Florida state court to impanel a twelve-man jury rather than the
six-man jury as provided by Florida law in all criminal cases except those
designated as capital. "Twelve men shall constitute a jury to try all capital cases,
and six men shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal cases. F A. STAT. ANN.
§ 913.10(1) (1967). Petitioner claimed that the statute violated his sixth amend-
ment right to a jury trial. The motion was denied and petitioner was convicted
as charged and given a sentence of life imprisonment. The Florida District Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Certiorari was granted on petitioner's subse-
quent appeal to the United States Supreme Court which affirmed. 90 S. Ct. 1893,
1907 (1970). Petitioner filed a second pretrial motion seeking to be excused
from FLA. R. Cmnm. P. 1.200 which required, among other things, a defendant,
on written demand of the prosecuting attorney, to give advance notice if he
planned to claim an alibi andto furnish the prosecuting attorney with information
such as the names and addresses of witnesses he intends to call. Williams contended
that these requirements violated his constitutional rights under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments not to be compelled to testify against himself. This motion
was denied by the Florida court and affirmed on the appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1898 (1970). The Court found that the notice-of-
alibi rule required nothing additional of the defendant nor bound him to pretrial
acts. The only effect was to force him to make decisions about his defense at an
earlier date but he still retained the right to change that defense. Id.
2 See note 4, infra, and accompanying text.
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